What are the Effects of Large-scale Violence on Social and Institutional Trust? Using the Civil War Literature to Understand the Case of Mexico, 2006–2012 by Ishiyama, John et al.
See discussions, stats, and author profiles for this publication at: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/322328663
What are the Effects of Large-scale Violence on Social and Institutional Trust?
Using the Civil War Literature to Understand the Case of Mexico, 2006–2012







Some of the authors of this publication are also working on these related projects:
communist and post communist studies View project
International Interactions View project
John Ishiyama
University of North Texas
194 PUBLICATIONS   2,557 CITATIONS   
SEE PROFILE
Felipe Carlos Betancourt Higareda




University of North Texas
7 PUBLICATIONS   9 CITATIONS   
SEE PROFILE
All content following this page was uploaded by John Ishiyama on 09 January 2018.
The user has requested enhancement of the downloaded file.
 0 
What are the Effects of Large-Scale Violence on Social and Institutional Trust? 
Using the Civil War literature to understand the case of Mexico,  2006-2012 
 
 
John Ishiyama   
University of North Texas 
 
Felipe Carlos Betancourt Higareda,   
Universidad Autónoma del Estado de México 
 
Amalia Pulido,  
University of North Texas 
 
Bernardo Almaraz,  
Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas A.C 
 
 
Paper accepted and forthcoming in  Civil Wars 
 
Corresponding Author: John Ishiyama (john.ishiyama@unt.edu) 
Address: Department of Political Science 
1155 Union Circle #305340 
Denton, TX 76203-5017 
  
 1 
There has been an increasing interest in the past few years in using the literature on civil 
wars to understand the large-scale drug violence that has occurred in Mexico. Up until recently, 
however, rigid disciplinary boundaries have worked against integrating the study of organized 
crime violence and political violence. As Kalyvas (2015, 1518) notes “crime has been a topic of 
choice for sociologists, while political scientists have focused primarily on political violence”. 
Nonetheless, the unprecedented scale of drug violence in Mexico have caused many to turn to 
the civil war literature to help understand conflict in Mexico (Kalyvas 2015; Osorio 2013; 
Schedler 2013;). Some, like Schedler, suggest that the large-scale drug violence in Mexico is in 
effect a “civil war” (see also Bergal, 2011). Based in part on the earlier work of Collier and 
Hoeffler (2004) that suggested rebel groups are motivated largely by greed, he argues that ‘‘In 
terms of motivation, the driving motives of violence [in Mexico] are not ideology, but material 
gain. The new Mexican civil war is not a classical civil war in which ideological insurgencies 
strive to topple state power. It is a prototypical ‘new’ civil war, fought for material gain not 
social justice’’ Schedler (2013, 6). 
Kalyvas (2015), however, is critical of attempts to characterize the large-scale drug 
violence in Mexico as a civil war, largely because the drug cartels do not have a political 
objective designed to undermine the existing political status quo, either via state capture or 
secession. Although dismissing the “civil war as organized crime” approach, he suggests that the 
existing civil war literature can be usefully employed to understand micro dynamics of large 
scale drug conflict, namely, the:  1) onset and termination of large-scale drug conflict; 2) 
organization of drug cartels; 3) the escalation of violence; and 4) how Drug Trafficking 
Organizations (DTOs) govern territory.  
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A fifth area where the civil war literature may be applicable to large-scale drug violence, 
relates to the political consequences of civil wars (Ishiyama 2014; Garcia-Ponce and Pasquale 
2013).  Recently, scholars have begun to examine the consequences of civil wars on post war 
politics, particularly how civil violence shapes political attitudes. For instance, Bellows and 
Miguel (2006, 2009), Blattman (2009), Cassar et al. (2013) and Voors and Bulte (2014) have all 
examined the how conflict affects social capital, particularly attitudes about political institutions 
and cooperative behavior (and interpersonal trust). Some argue that conflict increases trust, 
leading to greater participation in community organizations and political (Blattman, 2009; 
Bellows and Miguel, 2006, 2009). However, others contend that exposure to civil conflict 
reduces interpersonal trust, as well as trust in political institutions (Voors and Bulte, 2014; 
Cassar et al., 2013; Colletta and Cullen 2000).  
This represents our point of departure for this article--what is the relationship between 
large scale drug violence and political attitudes in Mexico? Although there have been many 
recent works that have examined the political consequences of drug violence in Mexico, most of 
these have focused on the impact of violence on the prospects for Mexico emerging as a “failed 
state” (Michaud 2011; Grayson 2011; O’Neil 2009) or has analyzed the impact from the 
perspective of criminological studies (see Rios and Shirk 2011). In general, there have been 
remarkably few works (at least in English) that have examined the social and political 
consequences of drug related violence in Mexico.1 The research that has focused on the 
relationship between politics and violence has generally concentrated on how the introduction of 
political competition as an independent variable affected the level of violence as a dependent 
variable (see Osorio 2012; Escalante 2011; O’Neil 2009; Astorga 2005).  
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More recently, some studies have examined how drug violence has directly affected 
politics in the country. Ley (2017), argues that criminal violence influences electoral 
participation, voting behavior and non-electoral participation. She shows that victims of crime 
in Mexico are less likely to vote, and the incumbent party is less likely to receive electoral 
support. On the other hand, she finds that,  while criminal violence may have a negative effect 
on turnout, it increases non-electoral participation. Rey (2015)  also shows that widespread 
violence depressed voter turnout in recent elections, which thus affected electoral outcomes in 
Mexico (generally affecting PAN supporters more than supporters of other parties). Schedler 
(2014) argues that the widespread violence in Mexico directly serves to undermine Mexican 
democracy, by threatening electoral integrity and eroding confidence in Mexican political 
institutions. Blanco (2013) suggests violence has decreased voters’ confidence in democracy in 
Mexico, with marked decreases in trust in judicial and legal institutions as the result of violence.   
However, what is generally lacking in much of this literature is on how violence has 
affected political attitudes in Mexico, in particular social and institutional trust (with the partial 
exception of Blanco, 2013). Further, we contend that not enough attention has been paid in the 
literature to separating out the individual and contextual (or sociotropic) effects of violence on 
individual attitudes.  In this paper we examine the impact of individual experiences with criminal 
violence, perceptions of security in one’s neighborhood, and higher levels of drug related 
violence at the community (municipio) level (proxied by drug related homicides) have on two 
important elements of democracy- social (or interpersonal trust) and institutional trust. Using geo 
referenced data from the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) and municipality 
(municipio) level data regarding levels of violence, as well as other control variables, we test 
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these relationships using data from a sample of 110 of the 2456 municipios in Mexico from 
2006-2012. 
Literature 
The idea that social trust is crucial for the development of democracy has long been a 
central theme in the literature on political culture (Almond and Verba 1963). In particular, social 
trust is seen as necessary for the emergence of civil society, which is widely believed to be 
essential for the development of political democracy (Foley and Edwards 1996, 38). It is often 
argued that social trust directly supports democracy in that people trusting one another leads to 
the formation of secondary associations, “which, in turn, support the stability of democratic rule” 
(Mackie 2001, 246).  
A second type of trust that is considered important to the development of political 
stability and democracy is institutional trust or confidence in existing political institutions.  
David Easton (1965) argued that in order for a political system to function it needs legitimacy 
through the public support of the system’s institutions as well as the system as a whole.  Indeed, 
a requirement for the stability of democracy is that the public is generally supportive of the 
regime and confident in its institutions (Chanley, Rudolph and Rahn, 2000; Newton and Norris, 
2000). Further, trust in institutions is related to the promotion of social trust because trust in 
institutions and the “the ability of associational life in general and the habits of association in 
particular foster patterns of civility in the actions of citizens” (Foley and Edwards 1996, 39). 
Institutional trust is thus an essential part of the development of civility and, hence, the 
development of democracy. 
 
Violence and Trust  
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So how does large-scale violence affect social and institutional trust? There has been a 
considerable amount of literature, particularly in sociology, that examines the relationship 
between violence and social capital. Although much of this literature has historically focused on 
how social trust impacts the likelihood of political violence (Bohara, Mitchell and Nepal 2006; 
Benson and Rochon 2004; Dahlberg and Potter 2001; Lederman Loayza and Menendez 2002; 
Robison and Siles 1999; Brehm and Rahn 1997; Glaeser and Sacerdote 1996; Fukuyama 1995), 
others have examined the effects of violence on social trust and social capital (Colletta and 
Cullen 2000; Cassar et al., 2013; Voors and Bulte, 2014).  
There has been considerable debate in the literature on whether violence leads to less 
social trust. Caroline Moser and Jeremy Holland (1997) and Moser and Elizabeth Shrader (1998) 
argue that violence in Latin America and the Caribbean countries has eroded social capital in 
diverse ways. Violence prevents communities from meeting locally, prevents individuals 
(especially women) from going to work and therefore extending their social network, increases 
school drop-out rates, and impairs the coverage of health services. These authors find that “there 
are often higher levels of participation in community action groups in less violent areas, and 
lower in more violent areas” (Moser and Schrader, 1998, p. 9). Colletta and Cullen (2000, 3-4) 
also argue that civil violence reduces trust. They note that violent conflict reduces interpersonal 
trust and social capital and contend that that “unlike interstate conflict, which often mobilizes 
national unity and strengthens social cohesiveness, violent conflict within a state weakens its 
social fabric. It divides the population by undermining interpersonal and communal trust, 
destroying the norms and values that underlie cooperation and collective action for the common 
good, and increasing the likelihood of communal strife”.  
 6 
More recently Kijewski and Freitag (2016), in their study of post war Kosovo, also argue 
that civil war negatively affects social trust—however they acknowledge that individual level 
experiences with violence are more directly related to social trust, more so than the effects of 
proximity to conflict. Nonetheless, they contend that civil wars have  “lasting psychological as 
well as social structural consequences provides people with clear evidence of the 
untrustworthiness, uncooperativeness, and hostility of others diminishing social trust in the 
aftermath of war” (Kijewski and Freitag 2016, p. 1) 
Conversely, there are also reasons to think that violence may lead to more social trust. In 
certain contexts, stronger social interactions allow individuals involved in criminal activities to 
exchange information and knowhow that diminish the costs of crime more easily. Furthermore, 
deep ties among community members may facilitate the influence of “successful” criminals, 
enacting them as role models and inducing stronger tastes and propensity for crime and violence 
in the community. According to Glaeser, Sacerdote, and Scheinkman (1999), these perverse 
social interactions may be the fundamental cause of the observed inertia of crime rates in cities in 
the United States.  Mauricio Rubio (1997) analyzes the role of drug cartels, guerrilla groups, and 
gangs in generating a perverse social capital in Colombia. He argues that these groups corrupt 
whole communities by providing youths with role models and by training them in the use of 
arms and violence. 
More recently, several scholars have suggested that civil wars can have positive effects 
on individual attitudes and behavior. Thus, Bellows and Miguel (2006; 2009), Blattman (2009) 
and Gilligan, Pasquale, and Samii (2013) have demonstrated how civil wars create the post war 
conditions for increased collective action, prosocial behavior, and political participation, Bellows 
and Miguel (2009) in particular find that civil war victimization does not affect trust within 
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communities, and led to higher levels of trust with individuals outside of the local community. 
These studies have suggested that the positive effects of civil war on social trust are due to what 
psychologists refer to as post-traumatic growth (PTG) (Calhoun and Tedeschi 2006; Tedeschi 
and Calhoun 1996). This approach argues that trauma resulting from violence can lead to 
personal growth, such as inducing new ways to relate with others. Indeed, research on PTG has 
found that individuals often feel more compassionate toward others as a response to violent 
trauma. (Glaeser et al. 2000). 
 Some have argued that there is no relationship between violence and social trust (Dineson 
et al 2013). For instance, Geys and Qari (2017) suggest that exposure to political violence has 
only very short-term effect and that there are no long-term effects of violence on generalized 
social trust. They suggest that violent events have only very limited, transitory effects on 
established social attitudes. Similarly, Arvanitdis, Economou and Kollias (2016), using data from 
the European Social Surveys, also find that the effects of violent events (such as terrorism) have 
no long-term effects on social trust, even in countries that have experienced multiple terrorist 
events. They suggest that in response to violence, individuals compartmentalize such events, and 
think of these events as “external” to themselves. However, these studies focused largely on the 
socio tropic or contextual effects of terrorist attacks on social trust, as opposed to the individual 
experiences of respondents. 
There has also been some literature that has examined the effect of violence on attitudes 
vis-à-vis confidence in judicial institutions and political institutions. Hoglund (2008)  suggests 
that excessive levels of political and criminal violence will severely challenge the legitimacy of 
the governing institutions. Hoglund further points out that that disproportionate levels of crime 
undermine people's trust in the state institutions and democracy. Other scholars suggest that civil 
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wars also reduce political trust. For instance, De Juan and Pierskalla (2016), in their study of 
Nepalese villages after the end of the civil war in that country, argue that exposure to civil war 
significantly reduces political trust in national governmental institutions. This is because the 
violence undermined confidence in governmental institutions to provide basic services and 
security to the population. 
 
There has also been some work on the impact of large-scale violence in Mexico on 
institutional trust. Blanco (2011; 2013) using cross sectional individual data from the Latin 
American Public Opinion Project and ENSI shows that (using the case of Mexico) perceptions of 
higher insecurity  at the individual level decreases support and satisfaction with democracy. 
Further they find that violence and the perceptions of insecurity reduce trust in institutions, 
particularly in those that directly deal with crime (police and judicial system).  However, this 
paper does not examine the nested effects of general regional levels of crime on trust in 
institutions (or the sociotropic effect of perceptions of crime) and the paper does not examine the 
impact of drug violence on social or interpersonal trust. Nonetheless this paper is one of the few 
that have sought to examine the impact of the rise of drug violence on levels of trust. 
However, some recent work by Garcia-Ponce and Pasquale (2013), using data from 
Africa (Afrobarometer) suggests that political violence in fact helps promote more positive 
assessments of the government. They find that individuals interviewed shortly following the 
occurrence of violent events in their district are substantially more likely to report trust in their 
head of state, parliament, local government officials, and police forces.  The authors suggest that 
this allows leaders to pursue strategies against the opposition (and promoting violence) in order 
to produce more support for the incumbent regime.  
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  In sum the literature has been rather divided regarding the impact of violence on social 
and political trust. Part of this may be due to the different levels of analysis. Many scholars who 
have examined individual experiences with violence conclude that such experiences reduce 
social and institutional trust. However, others who have examined the socio tropic or contextual 
effects of violence on the attitudes of those who live in proximity to large-scale violence  find 
less support for the thesis that violence reduces social and political trust. For example Dineson et 
al (2013) suggest that violence has no effect on social trust, particularly at the group level but 
may have an effect on reducing trust at the individual level(or what they refer to as the difference 
between “structural social capital” and  “cognitive social capital”).  This suggests that to 
understand the effects of large-scale drug violence on social and political trust in Mexico 
requires disaggregating both individual and contextual level effects of violence. 
For our purposes, there are three levels to take into account in examining the relationship 
between violence and individual attitudes—individual experience, neighborhood effects, and 
regional/municipio effects. In the first, individual experiences with violence and crime should 
impact the level of social trust, although as we noted above there is some debate over the 
direction of that effect.  The second is the neighborhood effect, or where violence is perceived to 
occur within close proximity to the individual and represents a threat to the individual, but the 
individual has not experienced violence personally.  The third is the regional context, in which 
the individual is aware of violence in the region in which they live, and the effects, if any, are 
largely sociotropic.  Awareness of violence affects the individual, but only because of greater 
fear that violence is rising generally.  
Before we turn to the quantitative analysis it is first necessary to provide a brief 
background to the large-scale violence that dramatically increased in the period 2006-2012. 
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Drug Violence in Mexico 2006-2012 
The history of rising violence associated with Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTOs) is 
well known among students of Mexican politics.  Shortly after assuming office on December 1, 
2006  President Felipe Calderon launched a war on the Mexican Drug Trafficking Organizations 
(DTOs) when 6500 troops were deployed to the state of Michoacan to end the violence between 
DTOs there. Although violence between drug cartels had been occurring for three decades, to 
that point the Mexican state had generally adopted a very passive stance vis a vis the cartels 
through the 1980s and early 2000s, with the former governing Institutional Revolutionary Party 
(Partido Revolucionario Institucional, PRI) establishing a tacit agreement with the drug lords 
(e.g. Astorga 2005). Indeed, the system that the PRI created quelled political violence by 
incorporating the opposition and paying of important private sector supporters (Rodríguez and 
Ward 1994).  These ties included ties with criminal elements as well.  Ties between the PRI and 
illegal traders began in the 1920s and 1930s and had solidified by the end of World War II 
(Michaud, 2011; Klessner and Lawson 2004).  In particular patron-client relationships between 
local officials and drug traffickers maintain the peace. In exchange for limiting violence against 
officials and civilians, the authorities made sure that there would be no prosecution of top drug 
traffickers (see also Rios and Shirk 2011, p. 16). 
This changed dramatically in 2006. The deployment of troops in Michoacan was widely 
regarded as the starting point of the Mexican government’s war against the cartels. As time 
passed, Calderón continued to escalate his anti-drug campaign so that by 2012 45,000 troops and 
police forces were involved in the war against the cartels.  
The escalation of the drug war resulted in a dramatic increase in violence, reflected in 
rising homicide, and cartel related homicides between 2007-2012.While homicides were 
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declined till the mid-2000s, they grew dramatically after 2007. According to Molzan, Rodriguez 
and Shirk (2013, p. 15)  drug related killing increased dramatically from 2007-2012.  Under 
Presidents Ernesto Zedillo (1994-2000) and Vicente Fox (2000-2006), the number of homicides 
declined, but under President Calderón (2006-2012), homicide levels increased to unprecedented 
levels. For instance, the general homicide rate increased from about 10,000 homicides in 2006 
nationwide, to approximately 27,000 homicides in 2011.  This increase was largely  “attributable 
to drug trafficking and organized crime groups” (Molzan, Rodriguez, Shirk 2013, p. 3). Schedler 
reports that the number of homicides attribtued to organized crime in Mexico increased fom 
2,221 in 2006 to 16,603 in 2011,  a nearly 750% increase. 
Further, there was a shift in the geographic distribution of drug related violence between 
2006 and 2011. As Molzan, Rodriguez and Shirk (2013 p. 20) note, the “the most obvious 
pattern illustrated by these data is the geographic proliferation of homicides over the course of 
the last several years”. As they note, in 2007 there were 1,876 municipalities with no reported 
homicides. However, by 2011 this number had decrease by 28% to 1,337. At the same time the 
number of municipalities that had experienced 25 or more annual homicides increased by almost 
a factor of five from 50 in 2007 to 240 in 2011.  
Thus, between 2006-2011 there was a dramatic increase in the level of drug related 
violence throughout the country. What were the effects of such violence on the level of 
interpersonal/social trust and institutional confidence? In the next section we outline the basic 
features of our research design, which seeks to address these questions. 
Hypotheses 
Based on the above literature we can derive several hypotheses related to the effects of 
violence on social trust/interpersonal trust and trust in political institutions. Further, as suggested 
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by the literature we examine each of these in terms of both individual, neighborhood, and 
municipio level effects.  
• Hypothesis 1:  In municipios and neigborhoods where there are higher levels of 
DTO related violence (and for individuals experiencing violence) there will be 
lower levels of social trust 
 
• Hypothesis 1a: In municipios where DTO related violence has increased, there 
will be lower levels of social trust 
 
• Hypothesis 2: In municipios and neigborhoods where there are higher levels of 
DTO related violence (and for individuals experiencing violence)  there will be 
lower levels of trust in a) judicial institutions b) the legislature c) local 
government 
 
• Hypothesis 2a: In municipios where DTO related violence has increased, there 
will be lower levels of trust in political institutions 
 
However, as indicated by the above literature, there is great potential endogeneity 
problem when examining the relationship between violence and especially social 
trust/interpersonal trust.  It is very likely that they affect each other. In order to address this issue, 
we conduct a further analysis of a sample of municipios, first establishing that in terms of trust, 
there was no significant difference between subsequently high violence municipios versus low 
violence municipios and then comparing, in a quasi-experimental way, the effects of the rise in 
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violence between 2007-2011 on levels of social and institutional trust. We would expect that if 
violence has a negative effect on trust, the decline in trust should be most pronounced in 
municipios that experience high levels of violence. For this hypothesis we only examine 
municipio level effects. 
This suggests the following hypothesis: 
• Hypothesis 3: In municipios where there were high levels of DTO related  
violence there were be a more pronounced decrease in social trust and trust in 
institutions than in municipios that did not experience high levels of violence. 
 
Methodology 
To test the above hypotheses we collected individual level data from a sample of 110 
municipios in Mexico (from the LAPOP survey data for 2012), which included 1557 
respondents. The 110 municipios were randomly selected from the total of 2456 municipios, and 
then survey respondents were randomly selected within each municipio. Thus, we are confident 
that that the sample is representative of the Mexican population.  Table 1 lists the municipios 
employed for the purposes of this study 
 
Table 1: List of Municipios included in the 2012 LAPOP wave 
Region State Municipality 
West  Aguascalientes Tepezalá  
Northwest Baja California Mexicali  
Northwest Baja California Tijuana  
Northwest Baja California  Comodú 
Northwest Baja California Sur Los Cabos  
Southeast  Campeche  Hopelchen 
Northeast  Coahuila  Parras 
Northeast Coahuila  Saltillo 
Northeast Coahuila  San Juan de Sabinas 
West Colima  Villa de Álvarez 
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Southeast Chiapas  Amatan 
Southeast Chiapas  Bochil 
Southeast  Chiapas  Tuxtla Gutiérrez 
Southeast  Chiapas  Villa Corzo 
Northwest Chihuahua  Ahumada 
Northwest  Chihuahua Chihuahua 
Northwest Chihuahua  Juárez 
Northwest Chihuahua  Ojinaga 
Center Distrito Federal Gustavo A. Madero 
Center Distrito Federal Iztacalco 
Center Distrito Federal Iztapalapa 
Center Distrito Federal Álvaro Obregón 
Center Distrito Federal  Tláhuac 
Center Distrito Federal  Benito Juárez 
Center  Distrito Federal  Cuauhtémoc 
Northeast Durango  Cuencamé 
Northeast Durango  Lerdo 
Northeast  Durango  Acámbaro 
West Guanajuato Dolores Hidalgo 
West Guanajuato  León 
West Guanajuato  Moroleón 
West Guanajuato  Pénjamo 
Center Guerrero  Eduardo Neri 
Center Guerrero  Iguala de la Independencia 
Center Guerrero  Leonardo Bravo 
Center Guerrero  Metlatónoc 
Center Hidalgo  Nopala de Villagrán 
Center Hidalgo  Pachuca de Soto 
Center Hidalgo San Felipe de Orizatlan 
Center Hidalgo  Tepeji del Río de Ocampo 
West Jalisco  Atotonilco el Alto 
West Jalisco  Zapotlán el Grande 
West Jalisco  Jamay 
West Jalisco  San Juan De los Lagos 
West Jalisco  Tlaquepaque 
West Jalisco Tonalá 
West Jalisco Zapopan 
Center México  Atizapán de Zaragoza 
Center México  Chicoloapan 
Center México Cuautitlán Izcalli 
Center México  Ecatepec de Morelos 
Center México  Ixtapaluca 
Center México  Metepec 
Center México  Naucalpan de Juárez 
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Center México  Nezahualcóyotl  
Center México  Nicolás Romero 
Center México Tlalnepantla de Baz 
Center México  Toluca 
Center México  Zumpango 
Center México  Valle de Chalco 
Solidaridad 
West Michoacán Morelia 
West Michoacán  Pátzcuaro 
West Michoacán Zamora 
West Michoacán  Zitácuaro 
Center Morelos  Jiutepec 
West Nayarit  Ahuacatlan 
West Nayarit  Tepic 
Center Morelos  Yautepec 
Northeast  Nuevo León Monterrey 
Northeast Nuevo León  San Nicolás de los Garza 
Northeast Nuevo León  Santa Catarina 
Southeast Oaxaca  Asunción Ixtaltepec 
Southeast Oaxaca  Mesones Hidalgo 
Southeast Oaxaca  Oaxaca de Juárez 
Southeast Oaxaca  San Lucas Ojitlan 
Center Puebla  Caltepec 
Center Puebla  Honey 
Center Puebla  Huaquechula 
Center Puebla  Ocoyucan 
Center Puebla Puebla 
West Querétaro  El Marqués 
West Querétaro  Querétaro 
Southeast Quintana Roo  Othón P. Blanco 
Northeast San Luis Potosí  Matehuala 
Northeast  San Luis Potosí  San Luis Potosí 
Northeast San Luis Potosí  Tampamolón Corona 
Northeast San Luis Potosí  Villa Juarez 
Northwest Sinaloa Angostura 
Northwest Sinaloa  Culiacán 
Northwest Sinaloa  Rosario 
Northwest  Sinaloa San Luis Rio Colorado 
Northwest Sonora Guaymas 
Northwest Sonora  Navojoa 
Southeast Tabasco  Centro 
Southeast Tabasco  Paraíso 
Northeast Tamaulipas  Matamoros 
Northeast Tamaulipas Reynosa 
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Center Tlaxcala  Ixtenco 
Southeast Veracruz  Boca del Río 
Southeast Veracruz  Coatzacoalcos 
Southeast Veracruz  Cosoleacaque 
Southeast Veracruz  Hueyapan de Ocampo 
Southeast Veracruz Xalapa 
Southeast Veracruz  Orizaba 
Southeast  Veracruz  Papantla  
Southeast Veracruz  Playa Vicente 
Southeast Veracruz  Uxpanapa 
Southeast Yucatán Mérida 
West Zacatecas  Fresnillo 
West Zacatecas  Tabasco 
 
To measure the dependent variable the level of interpersonal trust (or “social trust”) we 
used the following question  
 
IT1. And speaking of the people from around here, would you say that people in this community 
are very trustworthy, somewhat trustworthy, not very trustworthy or 
untrustworthy...?   
(1) Very trustworthy (2) Somewhat trustworthy (3) Not very trustworthy 
(4) Untrustworthy (88) DK (98) DA 
 
We recoded the question into dummy variable in which the response categories 1 and 2 
were recoded as a “1” and 3 and 4 were recoded as a “0”. This set the higher value as indicating 
a higher level of social trust. 
For the institutional trust dependent variables, we employed the following question. For 
trust in the judiciary we used: 
B10A. To what extent do you trust the justice system? 
 
 
For trust in the legislature we used: 
 
B13. To what extent do you trust the National Legislature? 
 
 
And for trust in local government we used:  
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B32. To what extent do you trust the local or municipal government? 
 
In each case we recoded the response categories in a way identical to the measure we 
created for social trust, where the higher value indicated more trust, and the lower value less.  
 Regarding the primary independent variables, we developed measures for individual 
experience with violence, neighborhood perceived levels  of threat of neighborhood violence, 
and municipio levels of violence. To account for the experiences of individuals with violence, we 
used the question regarding whether the respondent had reported being a victim of a crime, 
which includes many activities associated with organized crime such as armed robbery, assault, 
fraud, blackmail, extortion or violence (VIC1EXT in the LAPOP code book, with  1= yes and 2= 
no). Although this does not perfectly match with individual experiences with violence, it is a 
reasonable proxy for being victims of organized crime activities. 
 To account for the neighborhood effect we included responses to three questions where 
the respondent was asked to assess the level of security in his/her neighborhood, and to assess 
whether or not the primary security threat in the neighborhood came from drug gangs.  
Respondents were asked whether they felt safe in their neighborhood (AOJ11), whether they felt 
safer or less safe than five years ago (AOJ20) and whether they saw drug gangs as the principal 
threat to their security in the neighborhood (recoded variable derived from AOJ21).  
To examine the level of violence by municipio, and increases in the level of violence by 
municipio, we collected data from INEGI for homicides per municipality (as a proxy for drug 
related violence) and calculated the number of deaths per 1000 population, per year, and then 
averaged the number of deaths per year for the period 2007-2011. Second we calculated the 
percentage change in the number of deaths per population over the period 2007-2011. These 
were measured at the municipio level.For our control variables, we included both individual 
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level measures and municipio level measures. At the individual level we included individual 
evaluations of the economy, both currently (in 2012) and changes over time (since 2011) and 
individual evaluations of their own economic circumstances. These questions from LAPOP 
were: 
SOCT1. How would you describe the country’s economic situation? Would you say that it is 
very good, good, neither good nor bad, bad or very bad? 
(1) Very good (2) Good (3) Neither good nor bad (fair) (4) Bad 
(5) Very bad (88) Doesn’t know (98) Doesn’t Answer 
 
SOCT2. Do you think that the country’s current economic situation is better than, the same as or 
worse than it was  12 months ago? 
(1) Better (2) Same (3) Worse (88) Doesn’t know (98) Doesn’t Answer 
 
IDIO1. How would you describe your overall economic situation? Would you say that it is very 
good, good, neither good nor bad, bad or very bad? 
(1) Very good (2) Good (3) Neither good nor bad (fair) (4) Bad 
(5) Very bad (88) Doesn’t know (98) Doesn’t Answer 
 
IDIO2. Do you think that your economic situation is better than, the same as, or worse than it 
was 12 months ago? 
(1) Better (2) Same (3) Worse (88) Doesn’t know (98) Doesn’t Answer 
We also took into account the respondent’s estimated income level, and whether or not the 
respondent consider themselves “white” (recoded as “1”) or other (recoded as 0 which included, 
mestizo, indigenous, black, mulatto, or of another race)   
 At the municipio level data were also collected data that measured economic performance 
by calculating the GDP per capita change over the five year period by municipality for the period 
2006-2012. These data was available at INEGI 
http://www.inegi.org.mx/est/contenidos/proyectos/ccpv/cpv2010/Default.aspx. 
Analysis 
 In terms of the method of analysis, since we hypothesize, along with individual level 
responses, that municipio level characteristics affect individual level attitudes, we are essentially 
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arguing that the dependent variable is effectively nested within the independent variable. Thus, 
we opt for a mixed effects logistic regression model with categorical dependent variables, (e.g 
moderate/high trust or little/no trust).  Multi-level logistic regression is used to model binary 
outcome variables, where the log odds of the outcomes are modeled as a linear combination of 
the predictor variables when data are clustered or there are both fixed and random effects. This 
makes it particularly useful to assess the effects of higher level characteristics (such as the level 
of violence in municipios) on individual level responses (such as the level of social and 
institutional trust). 
Table 2 report the results of a multilevel logistic regression analysis using clustered 
robust standard errors with odds ratios reported rather than coefficients. Odds ratios are 
interpreted differently than general coefficients.  When an odds ratio larger than 1, this indicates 
the percent increase in the dependent variable; when the odds ratio is below 1, this indicates the 
percent decrease in the dependent variable. In addition Variance Inflation Factors (VIFs) were 
calculated for each model, and none of the VIF scores exceeded “2” indicating that there were 
not issues of multicollinearity that would affect our results. 
The results partially support hypothesis 1 above, but not at the individual level. As 
indicated in table 2, in terms of interpersonal or social trust, individual level experience with 
crime actually increased the likelihood of higher levels of social trust, by about 9% (although 
this relationship is not statistically significant) which runs counter to hypothesis 1 above. Thus, 
the results neither support those who argue that individual experiences with violence reduces or 
increases social trust. However, neighborhood and municipio effects are more important in 
explaining reductions in social trust. The extent to which individuals feel unsafe in their 
neighborhoods, and less safe than before, are both significantly related to decreases in the 
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likelihood of expressing high levels of social trust. Feeling unsafe in the neighborhood reduces 
social trust by about 31% and feeling less safe than five years before reduced social trust by 
about 25% (which are consistent with they hypotheses above). Further at the municipio level, the 
higher the average annual homicide rate per 1000 population the lower the level of social trust of 
the individual residing in that municipality (although the magnitude of that effect is quite small, 
with a reduction in social trust of only .07%). Changes in the annual homicide rate over time is 
unrelated to social trust (contrary to hypothesis 1a).  
 However, lessened social trust may not necessarily be linked to the activities of drug 
related gangs. Indeed, whether the respondent identified drug gangs as the principal threat in 
their neighborhood was unrelated to the level of social trust, and increases in violence at the 
municipio level was unrelated to levels of social trust. This suggests that what negatively affects 
social trust is a general sense of insecurity for individuals brought on by the sociotropic 
perception of higher levels of violence generally, unrelated to individual experiences, and 
unrelated to the threat of drug violence in close proximity to respondent.  
 
 Table 2: Levels of interpersonal trust and confidence in institutions. Multi Level analysis, 
odds ratios reported (cross sectional 2012 data) 
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Pseudo Log likelihood -688.890 -708.506 -.741.031 -748.433 
Chi-square 78.81 80.64 54.01 52.17 
Prob .000 .000 .000 .000 
 N=1129 N=1129 N= 1129 N=1129 
 
Turning to trust in institutions, it is important to note that we did not include the 
presidency, because popular judgments about the presidency often conflate assessments of the 
president as an individual as opposed to the presidency as an institution. Thus, assessments of the 
presidency are omitted here.  However, when examining levels of trust in other governmental 
institutions, again the results at the individual level do not support hypothesis 1. Exposure to 
criminal violence does not reduce trust in political institutions—in fact there is generally a 
positive relationship between whether the individual had been a victim of criminal activity and 
their trust in political institutions (particularly local government).  However, at the neighborhood 
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level, as with social trust, a lower sense of security does lead to less trust in political institutions 
across all models in Table 2 (although not all relationships are statistically significant). At the 
municipio level, however neither the level of violence, nor the level of increase in violence 
(contrary to hypothesis 2a above) are related to the likelihood that a respondent would express 
greater or less trust in the judiciary, the national legislature and in local government. These 
findings are generally in contrast to much of the literature that holds that violence should result 
in the reduction of institutional trust. 
However, as we noted above, there is a potential endogeneity problem when examining 
the relationship between violence and interpersonal trust (as well as other forms of trust). In 
other words, although violence may affect trust, the lack of trust, or lower levels of trust, can also 
lead to higher levels of violence (a point made by many scholars in the literature). To address 
this possibility, we propose a very simple way to assess the effects of violence on trust.2  First, 
we identify 21 municipios that appeared in the LAPOP data for both 2006 (the year before the 
dramatic rise in violence brought on by the Calderon administration) and the 2012 wave. Then 
we divide the sample into two, differentiating between high violence municipios (with homicides 
of 10 or over per 10000 population) and those with relatively low violence (or less than 10 per 
10000 population).  Of the 21 municipios, 12 were high violence and 9 were low violence (the 
list of municipios is reported in table 3). As a baseline analysis we then conducted a simply 
contingency table analysis and found that in 2006 there were not significant differences between 
what turned out to be high violence municipios (in 2012) and low violence municipios in terms 
of trust. The results for social trust are reported in table 4, but similar results hold for the other 




Table  3: Locations of municipios included that were included in the 2006 and 
2012 LAPOP waves. 
Region State Municipality 
Northwest Baja California Tijuana  
Southeast  Chiapas  Tuxtla Gutiérrez 
Northwest  Chihuahua Chihuahua 
Center Distrito Federal Iztacalco 
Center Distrito Federal Iztapalapa 
Center Distrito Federal Álvaro Obregón 
West Guanajuato Dolores Hidalgo 
Center Hidalgo San Felipe de Orizatlan 
West Jalisco Zapopan 
Center México Cuautitlán Izcalli 
Center México  Ecatepec de Morelos 
Center México  Nezahualcóyotl  
Center México Tlalnepantla de Baz 
West Michoacán Morelia 
Northeast  Nuevo León Monterrey 
Center Puebla Puebla 
Northwest  Sinaloa San Luis Rio Colorado 
Northwest Sonora Guaymas 
Northeast Tamaulipas  Matamoros 
Northeast Tamaulipas Reynosa 
Southeast  Veracruz  Papantla  
 
 
Table 4: Comparing  level of social trust, low violence municipalities vs high 
violence municipalities, 2006 
 Low violence (2007-11) High violence (2007-11) 
Low trust 39.36% 43.29% 





After establishing that there were no apriori differences between the high violence and 
low violence municipios, we then examined whether individuals in high violence municipios 
expressed lower levels of social and political trust than individuals in low violence municipios 
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after the period of rapid increases in violence from 2007-2011. As indicated by the results in 
table 5, it appears that the effect of the variable “2006-2012” (which was coded as a dummy) was 
not particularly related to levels of trust, comparing between individuals in low violence and 
high violence municipios.  In other words, if violence had a negative effect on trust, we would 
expect a much more pronounced impact in a downward direction on the levels of trust among 
individuals in municipios with high violence when compared to individuals in municipios with 
low violence. As indicated in the table this was not the case—that the violent period from 2006-
2011 had no discernable impact on levels of social and political trust. Trust among generally 
went up across all high violence municipios, quite the contrary to what was hypothesized above.  
Table 5: Level of trust comparing high violence municipios and low violence municipios over time. 
Multilevel Analysis with  odds ratios reported 
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Log likelihood -348.097 -156.117 -344.329 -157.047 -344.854 -158.170 -353.979 -138.563 
Chi-square 24.67 26.62 32.55 28.76 43.02 17.29 21.53 28.85 
Prob .012 005 .000 .002 .000 .01 .02 .002 
 N=544 N=253 N=544 N=255 N=549 N=255 N=549 N=255 
 
Conclusions 
 The results suggest that, contrary to most literature on the topic, the level violence in 
Mexico does not appear to have a direct effect on levels of social trust and trust in political 
institutions. Generally, at the individual level, individual experiences with violence and crime 
had no discernable effect on the level of social trust and in fact had a positive effect on 
institutional trust (contrary to much of the literature that suggests a direct relationship between 
individual experience and individual attitudes). However, the effect of violence is largely 
sociotropic. Indeed, a general sense of insecurity at the neighborhood level is related to 
reductions in levels of social trust. This would support more neighborhood sociotropic 
interpretations regarding the effects of violence on attitudes. If people perceive violence to be a 
great problem, they will have less social and institutional trust regardless, even if they 
themselves have not experienced violence, nor if there are high levels of violence in the 
municipality in which they live. 
The results suggest some rethinking is needed regarding the effects of violence on social 
and political trust. First there is little support for the thesis that criminal violence reduces social 
trust at the individual level. This may question the literature that suggests such a relationship 
exists, but it may also be the case that the kind of DTO related violence in Mexico is very 
different from the violence that occurs in civil wars. Indeed, it may be the case that violence is 
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largely compartmentalized by individuals to gang violence (or the belief that gang members are 
killing each other, and that has very little to do with “regular” people). Thus it is not surprising 
that individual experiences with violent crime and higher levels of municipio levels of violence 
are unrelated to individual attitudes---the violence around them does not touch the social 
relationships that individuals have with others, and does not affect how they perceive the 
performance of political institutions.  
However, if people feel generally insecure, then this negatively impacts social and 
institutional trust. The results would suggest it is not because of experience with violence, nor 
because of knowledge of actual levels of violence in one’s city or community, but the sense of 
insecurity that leads to less social and institutional trust.  
 The above findings, however, may also have broader implications. On the one hand, it 
might suggest that mass violence (including civil wars and civil conflict) does have a negative 
effect on social and political trust, but not in the direct way that is portrayed in much of the 
literature.  Violence shapes perception, and the sense of insecurity that results (i.e. the 
sociotropic effect of violence) reduces social and institutional trust, even for people who may 
live in otherwise secure communities, or who have not experienced violence themselves. 
However, on the other hand, it may be the case that the type of criminal violence that is rampant 
in Mexico is fundamentally different than other forms of civil conflict (which would contradict 
claims that the large-scale violence in Mexico is akin to civil war). Hence, large-scale drug 
violence may be less likely to directly lead to declines in social and institutional trust, than, for 
example, civil wars. Violence in Mexico is less likely to directly affect individuals than violence 
in civil wars, which would suggest that large-scale drug violence should have a very different 
effect on individual attitudes than civil wars. Whatever the case, much more work needs to be 
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done to investigate the relationship between violence and social and institutional trust, because 
such effects will undoubtedly have important and lasting effects on the development of 
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